ATHEISM BIHCHIANNA 3
Finfiahna
Chungchânga Harsatna (The Problem of Proof)
New Atheist Christopher
Hitchens-a thukhawchang sawi chhawn hlawh tak chu, “That which can be asserted
without evidence, can be dismissed without evidence,” tih hi a ni a. Tunlai
khawvel hi scientific world a nih miau avangin eng pawh sawi ila, ‘evidence’,
‘proof’, phûtna hi a lian tawh hle a ni. Hei hi thil thar a ni lo va, kum 1936 khan
kum 26 mi chauh AJ Ayer-an Language,
Truth and Logic tih a ziak a. Chu lehkhabu Logical Positivist ho textbook a
tling ta hialah chuan Verification Principle a tih chu telhin, “a sentence had
literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic
or empirically
verifiable,”[1]
tiin a sawi a. Ani lo lan hma daihin 1876 khan W.K. Clifford-an, “It is wrong
always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe in anything upon insufficient
evidence,”[2]a
lo ti tawh a.” Hei hi tunlai \hangthar Atheist-te intihchangkanna a ni awm e.
Ayer-a
thusawi khi a chak tawk loh chhan chu, a dân zam khi a dik leh dik loh ‘verify’
theih a ni lo! Eng tika ‘verify’ tur nge a tih aw? Kristian thurin zawng zawng
hi ‘verify’ theih, nakina ‘verify’ vek tur, a lai laklawhah kan la awm avanga la
‘verify’ loh mai a ni zawk. Clifford-a evidentialism pawh hi pawm vek theih a
ni bik lo. Evidence awm lovin thil tam tak kan pawm alawm (e.g., midang rilru
(other minds)). Ayer-a ang tho hian a thusawi finfiahna a awm bik lova ‘vawtu
êk cheh’ (self-defeating) case ve ve an ni. Finfiah theih leh theih loh
chungchângah chuan Theism leh Atheism hi ‘prove’ theih an nih loh dan a inang
chiah a. Ni e, Pathian chu logic leh mathematics thil ang mai mai a mihringte ‘prove’
theih leh ‘disprove’ theih mai mai ni awm lo tak a ni.
Heti
hi a nih avangin tunge mahni dinhmun finfiah (prove) tur zawk tih thuah pawh
inhnialna a awm ta a. Theism lama a inleh hma 1976 khan Atheist Antony Flew
chuan, Pathian awm rinna hian nitin nun leh science thil hmuh chhuahte a kalh
tlat avangin Theist ho chuan Pathian awm hi an proof zawk tur a ni, tiin a sawi
a.[3]
Michael Scriven pawhin Theist ho hian an thusawi hi pawmnahawm anga an sawi
dawn chuan a finfiahna an nei ngei turah ngaiin, chuti a nih loh chuan Atheism
hi a dingchang mai turah a ngai bawk.[4]
Kristian Philosopher
Alvin Plantingan hei hi a pawm bik hauh lo mai a. Pathian hriatna hi hringfate
tana ‘basic belief’[5]
a ni a, keimahnia awm sa a nih miau avangin hnawltute chuan a dik lohzia hi an finfiah
(prove) zawk tur a ni ang, tiin a \ang. Plantinga sawi dan hi ‘Reformed
Epistemology’ an ti a. John Calvina sawi \hin sensus divinitus (Pathian hriatna) chu mi zawng zawnga awm sa a
nihna behchhan a ni. He thil avang hian Theism chu mihring nihphung pangngai a
ni a, \henkhat Pathian awm ring hauh lo an lo awm a nih chuan Sual hnathawhah a
ngai mai a ni.[6]
Finfiahna
eng ang êm nge kan phût tih kan inbih chian fo a pawimawh ang. Pathian awm
chungchangah hian, 2+2=4 tih anga chiang leh hnial theih loh dinhmun ang kan
phût a nih chuan kan ti lutuk a ni ve thei tho lovang maw? Khawvel court-ah
meuh pawh, engkim phawrh fai leng loh pawhin, thu rinawm tawk a nih chuan kan
pawm mai si a. R.A. Reid chuan, “Strictly speaking ‘Proof’ exists nowhere
outside mathematics. There is no proof (accurately speaking) in empirical
science: there is only progressive verification and substantiation. In
Philosophy of Religion it has, it is true, been a custom to speak of ‘Proofs’
or ‘demonstrations’ of the existence of God. This is certainly scholastic
language,” a ti. Pathian hi a awm a nih chuan mithiamte hriat bik tur ‘proof’
ngan taka hriat tur a nih kher a rinawm loh va, mimawl ber pawhin kan hriat
tura a inpuan a rinawm zawk daih a ni. Tin, Pathian chungchâng hi a len em
avangin ‘proof’ leh ‘disproof’ chi hrang hrang hi mal\an thei an ni lo. Nun pumpui
huapa en tur ni awm tak zawk an ni.
Pathian hi
‘thil’ pakhat ve ang chauha kan ngaih chuan a buaithlak hle reng a. Entirnân,
‘pheichham’ hi thil pakhat a ni a. A awm leh awm loh pawh finfiah tura beisei
theih thil a ni. A awm ringtu leh awm ring lotu chuan thil dang zawng zawngah
an inthurual hnuin pheichham chu ‘thil’ pakhat dang a ni ve mai. Pathian awm
ring leh ring lotu chuan thil pakhatah an ngaihdan a rual lo mai a ni lo va,
nun pumpuiah an inkalh tihna a ni.
Hemi
chungchâng hi C. Stephen Evans chuan chipchiar angreng takin, “The person who
believes and the person who does not believe in God do not merely disagree
about God. They disagree about the very
character of the universe. The believer is convinced that each and every
thing exists because of God and God’s creative activity. The unbeliever is convinced
that natural objects exists “on their own,” without any ultimate reason or
purpose for being. In this situation there are no neutral “safe” facts all
parties are agreed on, with one party believing some additional “risky facts.”
Rather, each side puts forward a certain set of fats and denies its opponents’
alleged facts. There is risk on both sides…religious beliefs imply something
fundamental about how life should be lived.”[7] A
tawpkhawkah chuan Naturalistic Worldview leh Supernaturalistic Worldview inkar
a ni ber e.
[1] A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd Edition (Victor Gollancz:
Dover Publications, 1946),
[2] W.K. Clifford, “The Ethics of
Belief,” republished in Baruch A. Brody (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1974), 246. Skeptic David Hume pawhin 1748 daih tawh khan, “If
we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for
instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning
quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning
matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can
contain nothing but sophistry and illusion”. David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (New York: Liberal Arts
Press, ([1748]1955), 173. Mak tak mai chu Hume leh Ayer hian Atheist an inti
duh lo ve ve a ni.
[3] Antony Flew, The Presumption of Atheism (London:
Pemberton,1976), 22.
[4] Michael Scriven, Primary Philosophy (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1966), 103.
[5] A properly basic belief is a
belief that rightly belongs in the foundation of a rational noetic structure.
[6]
Alvin Plantinga, “Reformed epistemology,” in Phillip Quinn and Charles
Taliaferro (eds), A Companion to
Philosophy Of Religion (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 383–9. See also,
Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian
Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
[7] C. Stephen Evans, The Quest for Faith: Pointers to God
(Leicester, England: IVP, 1986), 28.
Comments
Post a Comment